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SEXUALITY INJUSTICE
CHESHIRE CALHOUN*
INTRODUCTION
The language of "gay and lesbian rights," following as it does
on the heels of the civil and women's rights movements, suggests
an affinity, a natural analogy, between the political position of
gay men and lesbians on the one hand and of women and racial
minorities on the other. Affinities are not hard to find. Gay men
and lesbians face a formidable array of discriminatory policies
and practices that limit their liberty and opportunity. Legally,
gays and lesbians are in much the same position as racial minori-
ties and women prior to the civil rights acts; they are unprotected
against informal discrimination and subject to differential treat-
ment under the law.
Any developed analogy between the political position of gay
men and lesbians and that of racial minorities and women, how-
ever, would have to go substantially beyond attending to formal
and informal discriminatory policies. Over the past several
decades, feminists and black theorists have developed analyses of
gender injustice and racial injustice as matters not merely of
inequity, but of oppression.' That is, gender and racial injustice
are also systematically built into the ways that we, as a society, live
and think. Implicated in gender injustice, for instance, are gen-
der socialization, the gender structure of the family, the unpaid
and devalued status of domestic-reproductive labor, inferiorizing
stereotypes, the conceptual distinction between public and pri-
vate spheres, the cultural normalization of violence toward
women, and the feminization of poverty.' To understand gender
injustice is to understand the place of women in socio-economic
structures and practices, the disadvantaging effects of occupying
that place, and the factors that systematically keep women in
place.
* Associate Professor of Philosophy, Colby College, Waterville, ME.
1. Marilyn Frye gives a classic definition of oppression: "The experience
of oppressed people is that the living of one's life is confined and shaped by
forces and barriers which are not accidental or occasional and hence avoidable,
but are systematically related to each other in such a way as to catch one
between and among them and restrict or penalize motion in any direction."
MARILYN FRYE, THE POLrICS OF RFALrY. ESSAYS IN FEMINIST THEORY 4 (1983).
2. See infra notes 7-8.
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The purpose of this essay is to understand the presumably
analogous group-focused injustice to which gay men and lesbians
are subject. What content can be given to the idea of a sexuality
injustice comparable to racial and gender injustice?3 A central
difficulty in developing the notion of sexuality injustice is that
lesbians and gay men, unlike women and racial minorities, do
not appear to be located in any particular social structural place.
The private sphere, urban ghettoes, "pink collar" jobs, menial
jobs, sex industry workers, the roster of welfare clients, the pov-
erty zone-these are all places disproportionately inhabited by
racial minorities and/or women. Gay men and lesbians, by con-
trast, seem to inhabit no particular place.
This article will argue that sexuality injustice differs substan-
tially in form from gender and racial injustice. In particular, sex-
uality injustice does not materialize in a disadvantaged place.
Instead, sexuality injustice consists in the systematic dis-place-
ment of gay men and lesbians to the outside of civil society. As a
social group, gay men and lesbians have no legitimized place.
Part I clarifies why one cannot go about investigating sexual-
ity injustice with the same assumptions and methods that have
proved so useful in understanding racial and gender injustice.
Parts II, III, and IV, using placelessness as the guiding theme,
outline some of the central contours of sexuality injustice. Part II
examines the way that apparent heterosexual identity is a condi-
tion of access to the public sphere. As a result of this condition,
gay men and lesbians must adopt a pseudonymous heterosexual
identity in order to gain full access to the public sphere. Part III
examines the legal, psychiatric, educational, and familial prac-
tices which seek to prevent future generations of lesbian and gay
people. Part IV examines criminalizing stereotypes of gay and
lesbian identity.
I. THE PROBLEM OF NON-LOCATED SUBJECTS
"We are everywhere," runs a popular gay and lesbian slogan.
Designed to challenge the disclaimer "I don't know anyone
who is gay or lesbian," the slogan draws attention to two key fea-
tures of gay and lesbian existence. First, gay men and lesbians
do not occupy any specific socio-economic structural position.
3. I have made up the term "sexuality injustice." I would have preferred
the less cumbersome term "sexual injustice," but this has long been used
synonymously with "gender injustice." The only other available terms-
"homophobia" and "heterosexism"-bear, like "gynophobia" and "sexism,"
overly strong attitudinal connotations and thus are ill-suited for describing
social, structural, and conceptual features.
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Although they constitute a social group, this does not translate
into a statistical concentration in any particular socio-economic
location. Second, it is possible to be unaware that gay men and
lesbians are everywhere because the "closet," coupled with the
presumption of heterosexuality, allows gay men and lesbians to
circumvent the discriminatory practices designed to enable
heterosexuals to disclaim knowledge of homosexuals. These are
not profound observations, but they have an important implica-
tion: theorizing about sexuality injustice cannot be modeled on
theorizing about gender and racial injustice. In particular, it
cannot employ the same concepts of 'social group' and
'oppression.'
A. Marxist, Socialist, and Liberal Approaches to Gender Injustice
Although Marxist, liberal, and socialist feminisms operate
from different conceptions of what justice is, they nevertheless
share a basic assumption and a common methodology, both of
which are critical to their making a case that there is such a thing
as gender injustice. The shared assumption is that women consti-
tute a social group, which means two things. First, people fall
into one of two groups-those who fit the identity "man" and
those who fit the identity "woman." Second, it means that, with
rare exceptions, the persons who fit the identity "woman" are
readily identifiable by others as doing so. Their identity is socially
visible. As a result, persons who are women will be socially
treated as women.4
Drawing a distinction between being a woman, in the sense
of fitting the identity "woman," and being publicly identifiable as
a woman should not suggest that "woman" is a natural or essen-
tial identity.5 However, an identity can be a social construct with-
4. This is not to say that persons who are women will only be treated as
women. Those persons will also have a race, a class status, an age, and an
ethnicity, all of which, insofar as they are publicly visible markers of identity,
will determine how they are treated. I also do not mean to suggest that being
treated "as a woman" amounts to some one thing. Again, race, class, ethnicity,
and age will shape the concrete form that being treated "as a woman" takes.
Nor do I mean to suggest that for all persons who are women, gender is the
primary determinate of how they are treated. Race and known lesbianism,
homosexuality, or bisexuality can have powerful consequences for how persons
are treated that are largely independent of gender.
5. For useful overviews of the essentialism-constructivism controversy, see
Edward Stein, Conclusion: The Essentials of Constructionism and the Construction of
Essentialism, in FoRMs OF DESIRE: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE SOCIAL
CONsTRUCrIONIST CoNTRovERS 325 (Edward Stein ed., 1990) [hereinafter
FoRMs OF DESIRE]; Daniel R. Ortiz, Creating Controversy: Essentialism and
Constructivism and the Politics of Gay Identity, 79 VA. L. REv. 1833 (1993).
1995]
244 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 9
out it being at all publicly obvious who has that particular
identity. The socially constructed identity "criminal" is a case in
point. Given a society in which "criminal" is an available identity,
there will be persons who are criminals-they fit the descrip-
tion-and persons who are not. But criminals can often conceal
their "true" identity, forge a counterfeit identity as law-abiding
citizens, and thus escape being treated as criminals.6
Women, by contrast, cannot usually pass as men. The fact
that women cannot evade being identified as women, and thus
cannot evade being treated as women, makes it possible to adopt
a general methodological strategy to uncovering gender injus-
tice, namely, asking where, as a result of being treated as women,
persons who are women end up being located in the economic,
familial, welfare bureaucratic, educational, military, and social
institutions and structures. Asking where women are located
reveals the fact that women are disproportionately concentrated
in "pink collar" jobs, in paid domestic service, in wife-mother
roles, and in welfare dependency positions. Gender, then, argua-
bly makes a difference to the lives of women that it ought not to
make.
Marxist and socialist feminism, for example, rely heavily on
the fact that persons who are women and persons who are men
occupy different locations in a gender-structured labor system.7
In particular, women do both unpaid sexual-reproductive-domes-
tic labor and (under)paid productive labor that exploits their
womanly capacities and characteristics. Analyses of women's
labor reveals the difference gender makes to one's vulnerability
to exploitation, impoverishment, and commodification (for
example, of one's sex-affective capacities), all of which are, from
a Marxist viewpoint, characteristics of unjust social systems. The
6. The term "counterfeit identity" is taken from JAMES D. WOODS &JAY H.
LUCAS, THE CORPORAEA CLOSET: THE PROFESSIONAL LIVES OF GAY MEN IN
AMERICA 75-76 (1993). Woods uses this term for gay men who actively manage
their public identity in order to pass as heterosexual.
7. See, e.g., CAPITALIST PATRIARCHY AND THE CASE FOR SOCIALIST FEMINISM
(Zillah Eisenstein ed., 1979); NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF
MOTHERING: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER 173-190 (1978);
SHULAMrrH FIRESTONE, THE DIALECTIC OF SEX: THE CASE FOR FEMINIST
REVOLUTION (1970); NANCY FRASER, UNRULY PRACTICES: POWER, DISCOURSE, AND
GENDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL THEORY 144-160 (1989); ALISON M. JAGGAR,
FEMINIST POLITICS AND HUMAN NATURE (1983); Ann Ferguson, On Conceiving
Motherhood and Sexuality: A Feminist Materialist Approach, in MOTHERING: ESSAYS IN
FEMINIST THEORY 153 (Joyce Trebilcot ed., 1983); Heidi I. Hartmann, The
Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism: Toward a More Progressive Union, in
FEMINIST FRAMEWORKS: ALTERNATIVE THEORETICAL ACCOUNTS OF THE RELATIONS
BETWEEN WOMEN AND MEN 172 (Alison M. Jaggar & Paula S. Rothenberg eds.,
2d ed., 1984).
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Marxist-socialist case for gender injustice thus uses a "place and
numbers" approach: there are identifiable places in the division
of labor which large numbers of women disproportionately
occupy, and which thus are reasonably regarded as "women's
places." Those women's places can be critiqued from a Marxist-
socialist viewpoint as wrongful or wrong-imposing places.
Liberal feminism similarly employs a "place and numbers"
approach. Liberal feminism relies heavily on the fact that
women and men occupy different locations in a gendered oppor-
tunity structure.' In particular, women confront formal, infor-
mal, and structural barriers (for example, the gendered structure
of the family) to securing social goods that men do not face.9
Analyses of those barriers reveal the difference gender makes to
one's opportunity for educational and economic attainment,
physical security, independence from patriarchal or welfare
bureaucratic authority, and the like. The liberal case for gender
injustice thus depends on a "place and numbers" approach:
there are identifiable places in the opportunity structure which
large numbers of women disproportionately occupy, and which
thus are reasonably regarded as "women's places." Those
women's places can be critiqued from a liberal viewpoint as
wrongful regardless of who occupies them or as unfairly distribut-
ing social goods and opportunities on the irrelevant basis of gen-
der, or both.10
B. The Problem With A "Place and Numbers" Analysis of
Sexuality Injustice
A "place and numbers" approach is not similarly useful for
analyzing sexuality injustice, because gay men and lesbians do
not constitute a social group in the same sense that women do.
First, persons arguably do not have a sexual identity in the
same way that they have a gender identity. There may be so
8. See, e.g., ZILLAH R. EISENSTEIN, THE RADICAL FUTURE OF LIBERAL
FEMINISM (1981); BE-ry FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (1963); SLvi A.
HEWLETr, A LESSER LIFE: THE MYTH OF WOMEN'S LIBERATION IN AMERICA
(1986);JAGGAR, supra note 7; SuSAN M. OKN, JUS'TCE, GENDER AND THE FAMILy
(1989); RUTH SIDEL, WOMEN AND CHILDREN LAST: THE PLIGHT OF POOR WOMEN
IN AFFLUENT AMERICA (1986) SEX EQUALITY (Jane English ed., 1977); WOMEN'S
WORK, MEN'S WORK: SEX SEGREGATION ON THEJOB (Barbara F. Reskin & Heidi I.
Hartmann eds., 1986).
9. See supra note 8.
10. See, e.g., OKIN, supra note 8. Okin's book exemplifies the liberal
approach to gender injustice. For her, the wife-mothering place in the family is
in itself a wrongfully disadvantaging place. In addition, because women are the
ones typically occupying that place, the wife-mother role unfairly limits women's
opportunities.
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much slippage and overlap between 'heterosexual' and 'homo-
sexual' that no clean distinction between the two groups is possi-
ble." Second, even supposing two clearly distinct sorts of
persons, homosexuals are not readily identifiable from heter-
osexuals. The social presumption that persons are heterosexual
unless there is clear evidence to the contrary helps to conceal gay
men and lesbians. And, like criminal identity, sexual identity can
be deliberately concealed. As a result, persons who are lesbian or
gay evade being socially treated as lesbian or gay persons.
Instead, they are treated as members of the social group "heter-
osexuals." That latter group, as legal theorist Janet Halley has
argued, is in fact a default group composed of persons who are
heterosexual and persons who are not but whose deviance is not
publicly identifiable. 2
In the absence of large numbers of obviously gay or lesbian
persons, there is little point to creating "gay places" or "lesbian
places" in the socio-economic structure where those identified as
gay or lesbian can be treated as homosexuals. Even were there
such places, gay men and lesbians would not be located primarily
in those places. Through the presumption of heterosexuality
and the active closeting of lesbian or gay identity, lesbians and
gay men move into heterosexual places in employment, the mili-
tary, and the family.' As a result, the "place and numbers"
approach that proved useful in revealing gender injustice fails to
reveal an analogous sexuality injustice.
Consider, for example, how the invisibility of gay men and
lesbians handicaps a Marxist or socialist analysis. Persons who
are gay or lesbian do not do any distinctive kind of labor. There
is no "lesbian work" comparable to "women's work," and only a
few occupations (e.g., hairdresser or clothes designer) are stereo-
typed as "gay jobs." One might, of course, argue that being
outside the labor system, and thus economically marginalized, is
itself a place to which gays and lesbians are assigned. It is true
that those identified as gay or lesbian may well be denied or fired
11. See, e.g., EvE K. SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 182-212
(1990); Judith Butler, Imitation and Gender Insubordination, in INSIDE/OUT:
LESBIAN THEORIES, GAY THEORIES 13 (Diana Fuss ed., 1991); Janet E. Halley, The
Construction of Heterosexuality, in FEAR OF A QUEER PLANET: QUEER POLrrics AND
SocIAL THEORY 82 (Michael Warner ed., 1993) [hereinafter FEAR OF A QUEER
PLANET].
12. Halley, supra note 11, at 85-86.
13. By "moving into the family" I have a number of things in mind. Gays
and lesbians can avoid being expelled from their native family by closeting their
homosexuality or lesbianism; they can be heterosexually married, creating
conventional families of their own; and they can create gay and lesbian families,
protecting those families from intervention by closeting them.
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from jobs in the paid workforce and prevented from participat-
ing in the creation, care and education of children. The attempt
to remove or exclude gay men and lesbians completely from paid
productive labor and the labor of reproducing the next genera-
tion is important in understanding sexuality injustice.14 How-
ever, unlike social groups whose members are readily
identifiable, gays and lesbians evade statistical concentration in
their assigned place. Thus, sexual orientation does not make the
kind of difference to one's material conditions that, by contrast,
gender does.
Lesbian and gay invisibility similarly handicaps traditional
liberal analyses. Neither formal law nor informal discriminatory
policies and practices have the necessary consequence of system-
atically preventing persons who are gay or lesbian from exercis-
ing their liberties or having access to opportunities. Consider,
for example, the substantially different impact of the military pol-
icy barring women from combat and its policy of barring gay
men and lesbians from military service. The -former effectively
bars women from combat. The latter does not effectively bar per-
sons who are gay or lesbian from service; it only bars the identifi-
ably.gay or lesbian. So long as they pass as heterosexual, gay men
and lesbians will occupy virtually the same location in the oppor-
tunity structure as heterosexuals. Once again, sexuality injustice
does not materialize.
Organizations on the religious right, such as Lou Sheldon's
Traditional Values Coalition, have capitalized on this fact (with
help from the gay rights movement itself, which has found it stra-
tegically useful to underscore gay and lesbian economic clout).
As part of their argument against'ascribing suspect classification
to lesbians and gay men, they have pointed to the dissimilarity
between the material conditions of racial minorities on the one
hand and of gay men and lesbians on the other.15 Arguments
assuming that a social group could not be a target of systematic
injustice if that group enjoys a reasonable level of material well-
being employ precisely the conception of group-focused injustice
that feminists and race theorists have relied on: group-focused
injustice occurs when large numbers of a particular social group
14. See, e.g., IRIs M. YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE PoLTcs OF DIFFERENCE 53-55
(1990). Young argues that marginalization-having one's labor refused
because of one's group membership-is one face that oppression takes.
15. The video "Gay Rights, Special Rights," produced by the Traditional
Values Coalition, takes just this tack. According to the spokesperson for TVC,
30,000 copies were distributed between July and December of 1993, 500 to
members of Congress and the rest to church groups, civic associations,
reporters, and local PTA's. VILLAGE VOICE, Dec. 14, 1993, at 23.
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are disproportionately clustered in opportunity-limiting and
highly exploitable places. Because this is not true of gays and
lesbians, the religious right, echoing Justice White in the Bowers
v. Hardwick16 decision, has tended to find gay and lesbian minor-
ity-rights claims to be facetious claims for special rights.17 Leftist
counter-arguments that point to the systematic disadvantaging of
those publicly identified as gay or lesbian miss the mark, since the
disadvantaged situation is not necessarily representative of gays
and lesbians as a group. Some gay men and lesbians protect
themselves against being disadvantaged by concealing their les-
bian or gay identity and adopting a pseudonymous heterosexual
identity. Others, who do not deliberately try to pass as straight,
are nevertheless routinely treated as heterosexuals, since the
social presumption is that persons are heterosexual unless
proven otherwise.
Locked into a conception of group-focused injustice whose
measure is access to socio-economic goods, both the right and
the left ignore the closet. The right underscores the absence of
high numbers of gay men and lesbians who have been disadvan-
taged, ignoring the compulsory closeting and presumption of
heterosexuality that makes liberty and access to opportunity pos-
sible. The left underscores the deprivations of liberty and oppor-
tunity suffered by those identified as gay or lesbian, ignoring the
way the closet and the presumption of heterosexuality protects
gays and lesbians as a group from suffering those consequences.
In what follows, a different methodological approach will be
taken to understanding sexuality injustice. Rather than focusing
on the disadvantaging effects of being treated as a lesbian or gay
man, this article focuses on the displacement of homosexuality
and lesbianism to the outside of civil society. In particular, it will
examine (1) the production of a heterosexual society through
the requirement that all citizens either really have a heterosexual
identity or adopt a pseudonymous one as a condition of access to
the public sphere; (2) the reproduction of heterosexual society
through legal, psychiatric, educational, and familial practices
whose aim is to prevent future generations of lesbian and gay
people; and (3) the legitimation of heterosexual society through
the construction of criminalizing stereotypes of gay and lesbian
identity that undermine the claim of gays and lesbians to full
civic status.
16. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
17. Justice White argued that against a background in which many States
have criminalized sodomy and still do, "to claim that a right to engage in such
conduct is 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' or 'implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty' is, at best, facetious." Id. at 194.
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II. HETEROSEXUAL IDENTITY AS A CONDITION OF ACCESS TO THE
PUBLIC SPHERE
Sodomy has a long, distinctive history as the unmentionable
crime. Prior to the secularization of sodomy prohibitions in the
1500s, "sodomy had been defined in strictly ecclesiastical terms
as one of the gravest sins against divine law whose name alone
proved such an affront to God that it was often named only as the
unnamable": inter Christianos non nominandum 8 Throughout
the 1600's, sodomy continued to be referred to within British law
as the crime that among Christians is not to be mentioned, and a
century later, Blackstone uses this same (non)description in his
Commentaries on the Laws of England, remarking,
I will not act so disagreeable a part, to my readers as well as
myself, as to dwell any longer upon a subject, the very men-
tion of which is a disgrace to human nature. It will be
more eligible to imitate in this respect the delicacy of our
English law, which treats it, in its very indictments, as a
crime not fit to be named: "peccatum illud horribile, inter
Christianos non nominandum."19
Even after the removal of sodomy from the roster of capital
crimes in 1861 and its reincorporation in 1885 under a British
statute prohibiting "gross indecency" between men, sodomy con-
tinued to be publicly regarded as the unspeakable crime-this
time not because of its grave sinfulness but because of its grave
violation of standards of decency.2 ° In the United States, some
state statutes still refuse to name what they prohibit, instead
referring with vague decency to "crimes against nature."21 In his
concurring opinion in Hardwick, Justice Burger recalled the
words of Blackstone, pronouncing sodomy "a heinous act 'the
very mention of which is a disgrace to human nature,' and 'a
crime not fit to be named.' "22
The history of laws prohibiting sodomy and acts of gross
indecency between men is simultaneously a history of the linguis-
tic taboo on publicly naming and describing both a specific sex
act (sodomy) and an amorphous class of same-sex interactions
18. Ed Cohen, Legislating the Norm: From Sodomy to Gross Indecency, in
DISPLACING HOMOPHOBIA: GAY MALE PERSPECTIVES IN LrrRATrURE AND CULTURE
169, 173 (Ronald R. Butters et al. eds., 1989) [hereinafter DISPLACING
HOMOPHOBIA].
19. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *215.
20. Cohen, supra note 18, at 188.
21. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 272, § 34 (Law Co-op. 1992); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 97-29-59 (1994).
22. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 194.
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("gross indecency" or "homosexual conduct"). Thus, this history
is one of laws that not only render privately performed sex a mat-
ter of public concern, but also privatize public acts of linguistic
representation. That dual history ultimately has the dual effect
of undercutting the claim of gay men and lesbians to have a pri-
vate sphere where their sexual, affiliational, and familial relations
are protected from public intrusion and of denying them any
entitlement to represent themselves in the public sphere as lesbi-
ans and gay men. It is, in brief, a history of denying to gay men
and lesbians both a private sphere and a public sphere. Sections
A, B and C below focus on the removal of homosexuality and
lesbianism from the public sphere, and their linguistic seclusion
as the "love that dare not speak its name."
A. The Privatization of Sexual Identity in Bowers v. Hardwick
In an insightful assessment of the majority and minority
opinions in Hardwick, Robert L. Caserio observes:
[W]hat is unsettling is that both sides cannot permit to
homosexuals a space of appearance in the public realm.
While the Court majority justifies supervising-and even
eliminating-homosexual privacy, and while the Court
minority defends homosexual privacy, both sides agree
that homosexuality is only a private matter. This exclusive
identification of homosexuality with privacy guarantees
that the judges, at their worst, will equate homosexuality
with ... sodomitical sexual intimaties... and at their best,
with emotional intimacies relevant only to the private
sphere. Hence for both sides, homosexuality has no pub-
lic, no political, existence .... So the arguments of both
sides of the Court maintain a long ideological tradition:
that homosexual life, whether supervised or not, is and
should be a closeted life.23
What Caserio draws attention to here is the double meaning of
"private." "Private" refers ambiguously to (a) what is done in the
private sphere behind closed doors, away from public view, and
often away from public knowledge, and (b) what is beyond the
reach of legitimate governmental control whether done behind
closed doors or not. Although disagreeing over whether sodomy
is private with respect to legal regulation, both the majority and
dissenting opinions in Hardwick agree that homosexuality (and
not just sodomy) is an inherently private, behind-closed-doors
practice. Both equate homosexuality with sexual activity, and in
23. Robert L. Caserio, Supreme Court Discourse vs. Homosexual Fiction, in
DISPLACING HOMOPHOBIA, supra note 18, at 255, 261.62.
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particular, with sexual activity that is completely disconnected
from life in the public sphere. Neither contextualizes homosex-
ual sodomy within the broad set of acts by which one might enact
a sexual identity, where that set includes not only private sex acts
but also public choices of domestic partner, co-parent, political
group affiliations, dress, styles of interaction with others of the
same and opposite sex, and self-representation as the bearer of a
particular sexual identity.24 As a result, the connection between
the demand to be let alone to conduct one's sex life as a homo-
sexual and the demand to be let alone to enter the public sphere
as a homosexual cannot be made.
rn the majority opinion, the privatization of homosexuality
occurs through the rhetorical strategy of equating homosexuality
with sodomy. Justice White's majority opinion and Justice Bur-
ger's concurring opinion repeatedly substitute the terms "homo-
sexual conduct," "homosexual activity," "homosexual practices,"
and "homosexuality" for the term "homosexual sodomy."25
"Homosexual conduct," "homosexual activities," "homosexual
practices" and "homosexuality" are not, in fact, equivalent
expressions for "homosexual sodomy." "Homosexual conduct,
activities, or practices" refers broadly to any activity that seems to
presuppose homosexual desires or a gay or lesbian identity. The
military, for example, classifies the attempt to marry someone of
the same sex as homosexual conduct.26 Sam Nunn has declared
that avowing one's homosexuality is itself homosexual conduct.27
One central effect of rhetorically substituting "homosexual con-
duct" for "homosexual sodomy" is to suggest that homosexual
conduct and homosexual sodomy are one and the same thing.28
Enacting a homosexual identity in one's conduct and practices is
thus reduced to nothing but performing acts of sodomy.
Reduced to mere sex (indeed to a single kind of sex act), homo-
sexuality appears utterly out of place in and irrelevant to the pub-
24. Justice White implicitly does contextualize heterosexual sex acts
within a broad set of acts by which heterosexual identity might be enacted. It is,
in his view, specifically homosexual activity that has no connection with
marriage, the family, and procreation. Heterosexual sexual activity, one is left
to assume, does have this connection to more public marital and familial
statuses.
25. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 186, 189, 191, 195-96.
26. 32 C.F.R. § 41, App. A, Pt. 1, H.1.c(2) (1993).
27. Pat Towell, Nunn Offers a Compromise: "Don't Ask/Don't Tell, "CONG. Q.
WEEKLY REP., May 15, 1993, at 1240.
28. For an interesting discussion of the confusion of act and identity in
White's majority opinion see Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and
Identity In and After Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REv. 1721 (1993).
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lic sphere, including work, social interaction, education, the
media, and the military.
Moreover, reduced to mere sex, "homosexual conduct"
ceases to include gay and lesbian marriages, parenting, and pro-
creative choices. Thus, homosexual sodomy not only has no con-
nection to heterosexual family, marriage, or procreation, it has, for
Justice White, no connection to homosexual families, marriages, or
procreative choices, since these are not recognized as possible
forms of homosexual conduct. Marriage, the family, and procre-
ation are, however, very much part of the public sphere. Their
public aspects include public celebrations of marriages, anniver-
saries, and births, baby showers, maternity leave policies, spousal
health benefits, family-oriented public entertainment, public aid
to families with dependent children, tax breaks for married per-
sons, joint invitations to couples, entitlement to give proxy con-
sent, family planning clinics, artificial insemination services, and
adoption services. Claiming "[n]o connection between family,
marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activ-
ity on the other,"29 therefore, further displaces homosexuality
from the public sphere.
Justice Blackmun, though disagreeing that the state may
legitimately regulate sodomy, did not challenge the assumption
that homosexuality concerns only a person's private, intimate life
behind closed doors. The broad "right to be let alone" that he
identifies at the outset of his dissent, turns out to be, when
applied to homosexual sodomy, a much narrower right to be let
alone with respect to intimate, "intensely private," physical, sex-
ual associations that take place within one's own home. °
Because Blackmun, like Justice White, equates homosexuality
with mere sex, he contextualizes homosexual sodomy with other
(private) sex acts-heterosexual activity between unmarried per-
sons, heterosexual sodomy between married persons,"1 and the
(private) viewing of obscene materials."2 He does not contextu-
alize sodomy among potentially public ways of enacting an iden-
tity, way of life, or, in his words, "self-definition."33
29. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 191.
30. Id. at 199, 213.
31. Id. at 210, n.4.
32. The analogy between Hardwick and Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557
(1969), which concerned private consumption of pornography in one's own
home, is central to Justice Blackmun's argument.
33. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 205. That is, instead of relying on Stanley, he
might have relied more heavily on Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972),
which protected individuals' right to be let alone to choose "a way of life that
[may be] odd or even erratic but interferes with no... interests of others." Id.
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In sum, both opinions privatize homosexuality by mis-
describing homosexuality as a matter of mere sexual intimacies.
As a result, the unmentionability of lesbian and gay identity in
the public sphere is made to seem natural and normal. In other
words, the Court's rhetoric served to legitimize what is arguably
the central feature of sexuality injustice, namely the reservation
of the public sphere for heterosexuals only. This is not to say
that securing a right of privacy with respect to gay and lesbian
sexual activities is unimportant. It is, however, to say that the
rhetoric of privacy arguments can do as much to sustain sexuality
injustice as to intervene in it.
B. The Double Standard for Heterosexual v. Homosexual
Self-Representation
Heterosexuals move about in the public sphere as heterosex-
uals, and that identity is by no means a private matter. Public
social interaction and the structure of public institutions are per-
vaded with the assumption that public actors are heterosexual
and with opportunities for people to represent themselves as
such. Humor, formal and informal dress codes, corporate bene-
fits policies, "scripts" for everyday conversation about personal
life, public display of family pictures, and so on presuppose that
public persons are heterosexual. They also enable individuals to
publicly represent themselves as heterosexuals.34 Unlike "the
love that dare not speak its name," heterosexuality is the love
whose name is continually spoken in the everyday routines and
institutions of public social life.
This double standard for heterosexual as opposed to homo-
sexual self-representation is based on the assumption that hetero-
sexuality is and ought to be constitutive of what it means to be a
public actor and citizen. The equation of "public actor" with
"heterosexual actor" is in part sustained by regarding homosex-
ual identity as a private, behind-closed-doors matter, as White
and Blackmun did. It is also sustained by requiring that gay men
and lesbians adopt a pseudonymous heterosexual identity as a
condition of access to the public sphere, and by instituting a set
of discriminatory practices and policies that penalize individuals
for publicly representing themselves as gay or lesbian.
Because gay and lesbian self-representations, not the per-
sons themselves, are removed from the public sphere, gay and
at 224. In Yoder, the Court upheld the right of Amish citizens to decide against
extended formal schooling for their children.
34. See WOODS & LucAs, supra note 6. Woods and Lucas generally give a
thorough account of the heterosexualization of corporate life.
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lesbian exclusion from the public sphere is disanalogous to the
exclusion of women and racial minorities. Historically, the pub-
lic sphere has been the privileged domain of men and whites.
That privilege was (is) maintained by laws, policies, and practices
limiting women's and racial minorities' access to the public
sphere, and by penalizing overly public women and racial minor-
ities (for example, through rape and lynching 5). Significantly,
making the public sphere the privileged domain of men and
whites requires discriminating on the basis of status-i.e., dis-
criminating against persons who are women, and persons who are
racial minorities. By contrast, making the public sphere the priv-
ileged domain of heterosexuals does not. The presence of per-
sons who are gay or lesbian need not "contaminate" the
heteronormativity of public space so long as homosexuality and
lesbianism, as identities, remain private matters, and so long as,
in public, gay men and lesbians adopt pseudonymous heterosex-
ual identities.
This disanalogy is significant. Although gender and racial
justice, in the form of equal access to the public sphere, can rea-
sonably be pursued through policies prohibiting discrimination
on the basis of status, sexuality justice cannot. Status-based poli-
cies which affirm that public actors may be lesbian or gay fail to
address the basic mechanism by which gay men and lesbians have
been denied equal access to the public sphere, namely, the effec-
tive denial through laws, policies, and public practices that public
actors may represent themselves as lesbians or gay men.
C. The Lacuna in Status-Based Anti-Discrimination Policies
The distinction between status and conduct is not clearly
and explicitly presupposed by policies prohibiting discrimination
on the basis of race or sex status. On the contrary, restricting
distinctively raced or gendered conduct seems prima facie to be a
form of race or sex status-discrimination. Nor has the distinction
35. "Women have been raped by men, most often by gangs of men, for
many of the same reasons that blacks were lynched by gangs of whites: as a
group punishment for being uppity, for getting out of line, for failing to
recognize 'one's place,' for assuming sexual freedoms . . . ." SUSAN
BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN, AND RAPE 28 (1976).
"Laws were formulated primarily to exclude black men from adult male
prerogatives in the public sphere, and lynching meshed with these legal
mechanisms of exclusion." Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, The Mind that Burns in Each
Body: Women, Rape, and Racial Violence, in RACE, CLASS, AND GENDER 400
(Margaret L. Andersenm et al. eds., 1992). Hall notes that lynching increased
following Reconstruction, and rapes increased during the anti-feminist
backlash. These occurrences suggest a correlation between lynching and rape
on the one hand, and increased public activity on the other.
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between having a particular status and making one's status known
to others been presupposed by sex and race anti-discrimination
policies. On the contrary, one obvious effect of anti-discrimina-
tion policies is an increase in the number of persons who are
visibly racial minorities and/or women.
Both the status-conduct and the "having"-"making known"
distinctions have, by contrast, been central to policies that sup-
posedly do not discriminate on the basis of sexuality status. For
example, military policy concerning gay and lesbian service
members has in the past implicitly invoked, 6 and now explicitly
invokes, a distinction between status and conduct. That distinc-
tion is supposedly critical to framing a policy that does not dis-
criminate on the basis of who one is yet still grants the military
authority to regulate what its members do. In reality, the distinc-
tion is critical to keeping the military's public heterosexual.
Military policy prior to 1994 prohibited not only sexual activ-
ity between persons of the same sex, but also making one's
homosexuality known." Publicly stating "I am a lesbian" was no
less an offense warranting discharge than private lesbian sexual
acts. In recent discussion of the proposed new policy, revealingly
dubbed "don't ask, don't tell," the Senate Armed Services Com-
mittee chairman, Sam Nunn, affirmed that avowing one's homo-
sexuality or lesbianism is conduct and ought to be prohibited.38
Although the policy that actually went into effect in 1994 does
not make self-identifying statements automatic grounds for dis-
missal, it does make them grounds for starting an investigation,
"and once such an investigation is started, the service member
would have to prove that he had not engaged in homosexual
acts."39 In controlling public identity, not just sexual acts, both
old and new policies require that the persons who are to be
exempted from status-discrimination adopt a pseudonymous het-
erosexual identity.40
36. The Army at least claimed in Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d
699 (9th Cir. 1989), that it discriminated only on the basis of conduct not
status. Judge Norris argued that Army policy could not reasonably be
interpreted as drawing a conduct-status distinction. (See infra text
accompanying notes 103-105).
37. One of the bases for separation was the fact that "[t]he member has
stated that he or she is a homosexual or bisexual .... " 32 C.F.R. § 41, App. A,
Pt. 1, H.l.c(2) (1993).
38. See supra text accompanying note 27.
39. Michael R. Gordon, Pentagon Spells Out Rules for Ousting Homosexuals;
Rights Groups Vow a Fight, N.Y. TiMFS, Dec. 23, 1993, at A14.
40. Revealingly, General Norman Schwarzkopf testified that
"homosexuals have served in the past and done a great job serving their
country, and I feel they can in the future" but "it's open homosexuality in a unit
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Courts have also invoked the status-conduct distinction to
the same end of controlling public identity. In Norton v. Macy,41
the D.C. Circuit Court denied that sexual orientation was ration-
ally related to the efficiency of the civil service. Norton, a budget
analyst, was discharged from the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration for immoral conduct and for "possessing person-
ality traits which render[ed] him 'unsuitable for further Govern-
ment employment' "42 after confessing, in what even the court
deemed a dubiously legal police interrogation, to previous
homosexual experiences.45 The court ruled that employees
could not be dismissed simply for being gay or lesbian. Some
particularized and substantiated evidence of a connection
between the employee's homosexuality and the efficiency of the
service needed to be shown. But the court also emphasized that
the plaintiff was "an extremely infrequent offender, who neither
openly flaunts nor carelessly displays his unorthodox sexual con-
duct in public,"" implying that he might reasonably have been
dismissed for refusing to appear heterosexual in public space.
In a subsequent case, Singer v. United States Civil Service Com-
mission,4 5 the court came to just that conclusion. John F. Singer,
a clerk typist for the Seattle Office of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, was fired by the Civil Service Commis-
sion for "flaunting" and "broadcasting" his homosexuality and
for receiving "wide-spread publicity in this respect in at least two
states. "46 The Commission noted that Singer had kissed a male
in front of the building elevator and in the company cafeteria,
had applied with another man for a marriage license, had
"homosexual advertisements" on the windows of his car, was on
the Board of Directors of the Seattle Gay Alliance, showed by his
"dress and demeanor" that he intended to continue his homo-
that causes this breakdown in unit cohesion." Anne B. Goldstein, Reasoning
about Homosexuality: A Commentary on Janet Halley's "Reasoning about Sodomy: Act
and Identity In and After Bowers v. Hardwick", 79 VA. L. REv. 1781, 1803 n.115
(1993) (emphasis added) (quoting Norman Schwarzkopf).
41. 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
42. Id. at 1162.
43. Clifford Norton was picked up by a Morals Squad after he picked up a
man, drove him once around Lafayette Square and dropped him off again.
The Morals Squad interrogated Norton for two hours, and a NASA security
chief interrogated him for an additional three hours, before Norton finally
conceded that he had some prior homosexual experiences. However, he
denied that he was homosexual and denied that on this night he had done
anything more than invite the man he picked up in for a drink. Id. at 1162-63.
44. Id. at 1167.
45. 530 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1976).
46. Id. at 250 n.3 (quoting Civil Service Commission letter to Singer).
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sexual activity, and had received television, newspaper, radio,
and magazine publicity.47 Denying that Singer was discharged
because of his status, the Commission argued that Singer's
"repeated flaunting and advocacy of a controversial lifestyle"4"
would undermine public confidence in, and thus the efficiency
of, the Civil Service. The court agreed. Noting that "[t] he prob-
lem is to arrive at the proper balance between the interests of the
employee, as a citizen, and the interest of the Government, as an
employer,"49 the court proceeded to stress that what distin-
guished Singer from Norton was that Singer had not, as Norton
had, kept his homosexuality private.5" In publicly occupying a
discredited identity, Singer brought discredit on his employer.
In sum, status-based nondiscrimination policies like these fail to
remedy sexuality injustice precisely because they affirm, rather
than contest, the reasonableness of treating gay and lesbian iden-
tities as discreditable and discrediting, and as identities which citi-
zens can have no strong interest in publicizing (a point
elaborated on in Part M).
Briefly considering what the gender analog to status-conduct
distinguishing policies would look like brings the problem into
sharper focus. Imagine, for example, a military service policy
that, while claiming not to discriminate against persons who are
women, proceeded to ban all "conduct" that made women pub-
licly identifiable as women. Women would be subject to dis-
charge both for engaging in womanly activities (say, joining the
National Organization for Women or wearing women's clothing)
and for making the self-identifying statement "I am a woman."
Avowing their womanhood and/or flaunting or carelessly dis-
playing their unorthodox gender in public would constitute a
breach of acceptable military conduct.51 While not discriminat-
ing on one level (one may be a woman), this fictional policy
clearly discriminates on another. It both burdens women with
the task of managing their public identities so that they appear to
be men and prohibits women from doing what men may do,
47. Id. at 249 (summarizing Commission letter to Singer).
48. Id. at 251.
49. Id. at 252.
50. Id. at 255.
51. Although some women would find it easier than others to conceal
their gender and adopt a pseudonymously male identity (just as some gay men
and lesbians find it easier than others to adopt a pseudonymous heterosexual
identity), the status-conduct distinction would permit the military or any other
institution that adopted such a policy to claim that it was not discriminating
against persons who are women, but only against womanly conduct.
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namely, representing themselves as having the identities that
they do have.52
D. The Lacuna in First Amendment Arguments
It is tempting to argue that restrictions on public self-repre-
sentation violate First Amendment rights to freedom of speech
and association. The District Court took this route in Ben-Shalom
v. Secretary of th Army.5" Miriam Ben-Shalom, a member of the
army reserves, was discharged on the grounds that she evidenced
homosexual tendencies, desires, or interests. She had in fact
acknowledged on several occasions that she was lesbian. The dis-
trict court stated that the Army could not dismiss a service mem-
ber for simply declaring her lesbianism because this violated
soldiers' First Amendment rights "to meet with homosexuals and
discuss current problems or advocate changes in status quo" and
"to receive information and ideas about homosexuality."54 In
their critical take on Ben-Shalom, the editors of the Harvard Law
Review argue that "regulations that penalize individuals who state
that they are gay or lesbian ... burden the right to express dis-
senting views on sexuality and sex roles, and, as such, contravene
the First Amendment's goal of preserving a multiplicity of world
views and attitudes."55
One might think that this is why the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit erred in Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dis-
trict.5 6 Marjorie Rowland, a high school counselor, disclosed her
bisexuality to several fellow school employees. She was subse-
quently asked to resign; when she refused, she was suspended,
then transferred to a position with no student contact, and then
not rehired after her contract expired. Relying on the test set
out in Connick v. Myers,57 the court deemed Rowland's disclosure
merely personal, not the public speech of a citizen speaking on a
52. The example is not entirely fictional. While claiming not to
discriminate against persons because they are women or black, employers may
penalize employees for not exhibiting sufficiently masculine or white traits.
The disanalogy between gay men and lesbians on the one hand and women and
blacks on the other is perhaps best understood as one of degree.
53. 489 F. Supp. 964 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
54. Id. at 974.
55. EDITORS OF THE HARVARD LAw REVIEw, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE
LAw 63 (1989).
56. 730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984).
57. The court explained:
In Connick the Court held that "when a public employee speaks not as
a citizen upon matters of public concern, but instead as an employee
upon matters only of personal interest, absent the most unusual
circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which
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matter of public concern. It thus refused to grant First Amend-
ment protections to her disclosure.
Both Judge Edwards, dissenting from the Sixth Circuit
Court's majority opinion, and Justice Brennan, dissenting from
the denial of certiorari,5" took issue with this classification of
Rowland's identity-statement as merely personal. The circuit
court had argued that "[t] here was absolutely no evidence of any
public concern in the community or at Stebbins High with the
issue of bisexuality among school personnel when she began
speaking to others about her own sexual preference."59 Taking a
larger view of the public, both Judge Edwards6" and Justice Bren-
nan 61 argued that public debate abbut the rights of homosexuals
was in fact currently ongoing (even if not at Stebbins High), and
thus "[t] he fact of petitioner's bisexuality, once spoken, necessar-
ily and ineluctably involved her in that debate."62
However tempting invoking First Amendment protections
may be, there is something odd about classifying representations
of one's identity as either public or private speech. Consider, first,
the fictional gender policy. Is discharging a person for stating "I
am a woman" best criticized as a violation of rights to speech,
expression, and association? Is one's gender, like one's political
views, simply a possible subject of speech or basis of association?
Or is it instead constitutive of being a speaker? In our social
world, gender is such a fundamental social category that it is the
first thing people want to know about the persons with whom
they interact, and "[t]he pressure on each of us to guess or deter-
mine the sex of everybody else both generates and is exhibited in
a great pressure on each of us to inform everybody all the time of
our sex."63 Furthermore, in our social world the psychological
process of becoming gendered is part of the process of becoming
a self, a subject, an "I". In short, speakers enter into the world of
speech and expression as gendered subjects. Thus gender is bet-
ter viewed as a feature of being a speaker rather than simply
something one might wish to express to others. To prohibit a
particular gendered self-representation in the public world is,
to review the wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public agency
allegedly in reaction to the employee's behavior."
Id. at 449 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983)).
58. Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., 470 U.S. 1009 (1985).
59. Rowland, 730 F.2d at 449.
60. Id. at 452-53.
61. Rowland, 470 U.S. at 1012.
62. Id.
63. FRYE, supra note 1, at 17, 23. Frye argues that sex-marking and sex-
identification are basic to, and a condition of the intelligibility of, our
interactions.
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then, to do much more than restrict what a speaker may say or
with whom she may associate. It is to deny that a particular sub-
ject may speak at all. Under the fictional gender policy, women
may not speak. Only men, real and pseudonymous, may.
Like gender, sexuality is a fundamentally constitutive feature
of our social world and of the persons who inhabit it. For better
or worse, we have inherited a view of sexuality as something that,
like gender, pervades the entire personality and orients persons
in the social world. Persons enter the adult world of speech and
expression as sexual subjects. Unlike gender, however, the pres-
sure to know others' and make clear one's own sexuality is
relieved, for heterosexuals at least, by the presumption of univer-
sal heterosexuality. That presumed heterosexuality, however, is
better viewed as a presumption about what it means to be a
speaker rather than a presumption about what speakers might
wish to express. As in the case of gender, prohibiting a particular
sexual self-representation in the public world not only restricts
the content of speech, but, more importantly, denies that les-
bian, gay, or bisexual subjects may speak at all. Only heterosexu-
als, real and pseudonymous, may.
The upshot of the decision in Rowland was precisely to deny
that a bisexual subject may speak. Although denying that Row-
land could be penalized simply for her status as a bisexual, it
affirmed that it was permissible for the school to discipline her
for making statements about her sexual preference.' In a social
context like ours, where speakers' heterosexuality is presumed,
this amounts to ruling that employers may penalize their employ-
ees for refusing to speak as (presumed) heterosexual subjects.
In short, the First Amendment protects speech, guarantee-
ing that some things may be said It does not protect speakers,
guaranteeing that some sorts of speakers may do the saying. When.
Marjorie Rowland announced "I am a bisexual," she specified
who was doing the saying. However unfortunate the conse-
quences, the court majority was right not to. equate, as Judge
Edwards and Justice Brennan did, her statement "I am a bisex-
ual" with the expression of an opinion about sexuality. To secure
openly gay men's and lesbians' access to the public sphere by
equating self-identifying statements with expressions of opinion
thus errs, first, by mistaking the question of who may speak for
the question of what may be said.
Second, securing access to the public sphere under the First
Amendment implies that openly gay men and lesbians have enti-
tlement only to politicized publicity and only to the public sphere
64. Rowland, 730 F.2d at 450.
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of political debate. It implies, that is, that they have no claim to
being mentionable-to being public-except under social condi-
tions that make their mention a political, public, and debated
subject. This was, in essence, both the Sixth Circuit's majority
view and that ofJudge Edwards and Justice Brennan. Their disa-
greement centered on the question of whether or not bisexuality
was in fact a subject of political debate, and thus whether Row-
land's self-identifying statement qualified for First Amendment
protection. No one questioned the broader implications of
interpreting the entitlement to publicly identify oneself as a First
Amendment entitlement, and thus of protecting self-identifica-
tions only on condition that they occur as part of a larger public
debate. But when the formally equal First Amendment entitle-
ment of all persons to identify their sexuality in the public arena
is put into play in a heteronormative social world, the result will
be de facto inequality between heterosexuals' and nonheterosexu-
als' entitlement to utter self-identifying statements. To say that
the social world is heteronormative is to say that the social world
is structured on the presumption that it is both natural and nor-
mal for persons to be heterosexual. The heteronormativity of
the social world guarantees that heterosexuals will have broad
access, as heterosexuals, to all public spaces and all social life that
takes place beyond the closed doors of their homes-streets,
workplaces, schools, and entertainment. Thus, heterosexuals
need not rely on First Amendment protections to guarantee the
acceptable publicizing of heterosexual identity. They need not
prove that "I am a heterosexual" is part of a public debate in
order to secure their public self-identifications. In fact, the
access of heterosexuals to the public sphere is not conditional,
nor is the public to which they are guaranteed access limited to a
sphere of political debate.
Finally, by entering the public sphere only under the aegis
of free speech, openly gay, lesbian and bisexual persons enter
public space as debatable speakers. If to proclaim one's homosex-
uality is itself equivalent to stating a political opinion, then that
same proclamation will also necessarily and ineluctably be an
invitation to having one's deviance from heterosexual norms
challenged and debated by others. Once publicly proclaimed,
there will be no social immunity from public scrutiny and public
criticism. By contrast, the heteronormativity of public life
outside the private home guarantees that heterosexual self-repre-
sentation will be immunized against public scrutiny and chal-
lenge. Put simply, heterosexuals may claim that their
heterosexual lives (of dating, flirting, marriage, procreating, etc.)
is their private business-not open for debate-while simultane-
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ously enacting those "private" lives in public space. The liberty to
conduct one's "private" life in this public nonpoliticized space is
precisely what gay men and lesbians do not have. Rowland legiti-
mized their not having this liberty.
In sum, neither status-based anti-discrimination policies nor
First Amendment protections of speech adequately guarantee
gay men and lesbians that they may dare speak their names.
Because public, self-identifying statements may be deemed "con-
duct" rather than integrally connected to status, status-based poli-
cies may simply entitle individuals to be lesbian or gay in public
space, but not to represent themselves as lesbian or gay in public
space. Because the First Amendment only protects speech on
matters of public concern, it protects gay men's and lesbians'
self-identifying statements only when they are part of a public
debate about homosexual rights. Self-identifications, like
Marjorie Rowland's, uttered in confidence or as part of everyday
personal conversation in public space escape First Amendment
protection. Thus the First Amendment entitles lesbians and gay
men to enter arguments about their sexuality; it does not entitle
them to be lesbian or gay speakers regardless of the subject of
conversation.
III. PREVENTING FuTuRE GENERATIONS OF GAY AND
LESBIAN PERSONS
From the first emergence of "sexual inversion" in psychiatric
taxonomies of the late 1800s, the distinctions between congenital
and acquired conditions, between personality type and behavior,
and between cross-genderization and same-sex conduct were cen-
tral to understandings of the forms that homosexuality and lesbi-
anism could take. For turn of the century sexologists Havelock
Ellis and Richard von Krafft-Ebing, both of whom played a cen-
tral role in establishing and defining sexual inversion as a psychi-
atric condition, "true" inverts came by their homosexuality
congenitally; and their distinguishing feature was not the orienta-
tion of their desire, but their cross-genderization, that is, their
apparent constitution as a unique personality type-the "third
sex."6 5 True, congenital inversion was contrasted with acquired,
situational inversion. Situational factors were thought to be
capable of turning "true" heterosexuals into persons who,
though not significantly cross-gendered, sexually desired others
of the same sex. Those situational factors included childhood
65. See HAVELOCK ELLIS, STUDIES IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX, VOL. II:
SEXUAL INVERSION (1928); RICHARD VON KRAFFr-EBING, PSYCHOPATHIA SEXUALIS:
A MEDIco-FoRENSIC STUDY (1947).
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masturbation, confinement to same-sex environments in prisons,
convents, and boarding schools, participation in the women's
movement, and the seductive advances of true inverts. While
congenital inversion was, perhaps, incorrigible, acquired inver-
sion was, on this view, both curable and preventable by manipu-
lating situational factors and inculcating proper sexual habits.
The "true" versus "acquired" distinction affected and contin-
ues to affect policy concerning gay men and lesbians in this cen-
tury. During World War II, for example, psychiatrists became
increasingly involved in setting military policy. Motivated partly
by psychiatric insistence on the difference between true homo-
sexuality and mere homosexual conduct, and partly by the practi-
cal need to retain military personnel, the military attempted to
distinguish "true" from "salvageable" homosexuals.66 Current
military policy continues to distinguish between true and situa-
tional homosexuals, with the burden of proof falling on those
charged with homosexual conduct to demonstrate that they are
"truly" heterosexuals.
67
In the 1990's, the search for a gay gene continues the tradi-
tion of equating true homosexuality with a congenital condition.
Arguments for gay-tolerant policies based on the claim that gay
men and lesbians are "born that way" fall squarely in line with
turn of the century arguments, most notably by Magnus Hirsch-
feld and his Scientific-Humanitarian Committee, for social
acceptance of the congenital invert.' Given, however, a perva-
sive cultural distinction between true and situational homosexu-
als, such arguments are doomed from the outset to be ineffective
against a broad band of social policies whose aim is not so much
the differential treatment of (truly and incorrigibly) gay and les-
bian persons as the prevention of new gay and lesbian persons.
In an essay ironically titled "How to Bring Your Kids up
Gay," Eve Sedgwick argues that increasing tolerance of adult gay
persons has gone hand in hand with the attempt to prevent new
gay persons from coming into being.69 She notes that in the
same year that the American Psychiatric Association removed
homosexuality from the roster of pathological conditions in its
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-III), it introduced the
66. ALLAN BCRUBt, COMING OUT UNDER FiRE: A HISTORY OF GAY MEN AND
WOMEN IN WORLD WAR 11 136-138 (1990).
67. 32 C.F.R. § 41, App. A, Pt.1, H.1.c(2) (1993).
68. JOHN LAURITSEN & DAVID THORSTAD, THE EARLY HOMOSEXUAL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT, 1864-1935 (1974).
69. EVE K. SEDGWICK, How to Bring Your Kids up Gay, in FEAR OF A QUEER
PLANET, supra note 11, at 69.
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new category Gender Identity Disorder of Childhood.7 ° Boys
become susceptible to this diagnosis if, in addition to expressing
distress about being a boy, they display a "preoccupation with
female stereotypical activities as manifested by. a preference for
either cross-dressing or simulating female attire, or by a compel-
ling desire to participate in the games and pastimes of girls."71
The revised edition, DSM-III-R, adds, "and rejection of male ster-
eotypical toys, games, and activities."7 Similarly, in DSM-III-R,
girls become susceptible to this diagnosis if, in addition to
expressing distress about being a girl, they show a "persistent
marked aversion to normative feminine clothing and insistence
on wearing stereotypical masculine clothing, e.g., boys' under-
wear and other accessories."73 Harkening back to sexologists'
equation of true inversion, not with same-sex desire, but with
cross-genderization, this new disorder appears to be as much
about the early detection and prevention of homosexuality as
about control of gender deviance. The message of DSM-III, in
Sedgwick's view, is that while existing adult homosexuals deserve
dignified treatment at the hands of psychiatric professionals, psy-
chiatrists may (perhaps ought to) intervene in the lives of proto-
gay children to prevent new gay persons from coming into
being.74
Gay preventative measures have been framed not only as
matters of gender health, but matters also of parental rights and
duties. One of the psychiatrists Sedgwick critiques, for example,
invokes the theory of parental dominion to justify parental inter-
vention in proto-gay children's lives: "the rights of parents to
oversee the development of children is a long-established princi-
ple. Who is to dictate that parents may not try to raise their chil-
dren in a manner that maximizes the possibility of a heterosexual
outcome?" 75 Others construe intervention as obligatory. In her
article advocating gay access to surrogacy, Sharon Elizabeth Rush
70. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (3d ed. 1980). The American Psychiatric
Association de-pathologized homosexuality in 1973, although DSM-III was not
published until 1980.
71. Id. at 266.
72. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 73 (3d rev. ed. 1987).
73. Id.
74. Dignified treatment of gay men and lesbians within psychiatry has
not, of course, always been the norm. Efforts to "cure" gay men and lesbians
reached their peak during the 1950s and 1960s. For an autobiographical
account, see MARTIN DUBERMAN, CURES: A GAY MAN'S ODYSSEY (1992).
75. SEDGWICK, supra note 69, at 78.
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moves swiftly from sanctioning adult homosexuality to condemn-
ing the creation of new gay persons:
Many heterosexual parents may be quite tolerant and
accepting of homosexuality, and many homosexual par-
ents may be quite proud to be homosexual. Nevertheless,
given the social reprobation that at present attaches to
being homosexual in the United States, and given the love
and affection that most parents feel toward their children,
I find it unbelievable that any parents-heterosexual or
homosexual-would teach their children to be homosex-
ual. Responsible and loving parents who were given a
choice, in my opinion, simply would not choose to subject
their child to the pain and isolation that inevitably attach
to being a member of a socially disdained group.76
However legitimated-whether on grounds of psychological
health, parental rights, or parental obligation-the goal of
preventing kids from turning out gay underlies policy that
restricts gay and lesbian parenting, employment in child care,
participation in early education and child service organizations
(such as the Boy Scouts of America), and the sexual content of
school curricula.
One of the University of Missouri's principal reasons for
refusing to recognize the student group Gay Lib was that " [w] hat
happens to a latent or potential homosexual from the standpoint
of his environment can cause him to become or not to become a
homosexual."77 In the University's and dissentingJudge Regan's
view, the University had a responsibility to protect potential
homosexuals from becoming overt homosexuals.78 And that, in
their view, meant protecting them from being influenced by
their fellow (overtly) gay and lesbian students.
The goal of preventing new gay and lesbian persons also fig-
ured centrally in the court ruling on the New Hampshire adop-
tion law that "prohibits any person who is homosexual from
adopting any person, from being licensed as a member of a fos-
ter family, and from running day care centers."79 In response to
the New Hampshire House of Representatives' request for ajudi-
cial opinion on the constitutionality of this law (then, House Bill
76. Sharon E. Rush, Breaking with Tradition: Surrogacy and Gay Fathers, in
KINDRED MATrERS" RETHINKING THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE FAMILY 102, 119 (Diana
Tietjens Meyers, et al. eds., 1993).
77. Gay Lib v. University of Mo., 558 F.2d 848, 852 (8th Cir. 1977)
(summarizing the Board of Curators of the University of Missouri's resolution).
78. Id. at 859.
79. H.R. 70, N.H. Regular Sess. (1987), quoted in In re Opinion of the
Justices, 530 A.2d 21, 23 (N.H. 1987) (discussing constitutionality of the bill).
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70), the New Hampshire Supreme Court ignored any criteria of
fitness to parent other than capacity to raise children to be heter-
osexual. In its view, "the legislature can rationally act on the the-
ory that a role model can influence the child's developing sexual
identity,"80 and thus can legitimately regard gay and lesbian per-
sons as unfit for adoptive and foster parenting.
Similar worries about the possibility of creating new genera-
tions of gay and lesbian persons surface in custody cases. Gay
and lesbian parents may be subjected to special visitation restric-
tions designed to prevent their children from exposure to gay
"lifestyles"; for example, the child may not be taken to gay/les-
bian gatherings or gay churches, visit overnight, or visit while a
same-sex partner or other "known homosexuals" are present;
and the parent may be required to end a same-sex relationship
or not live with his or her partner.
8
'
Gay prevention also appears to underlie attempts to outlaw
the "promotion" of homosexuality. In 1988, Britain passed
Clause 28 of the Local Government Act which stipulated that "A
local authority shall not- (a) intentionally promote homosexual-
ity or publish material with the intention of promoting homosex-
uality; (b) promote the teaching in any maintained school of the
acceptability of homosexuality as a pretended family relation-
ship."8 2 In a similar vein, a 1992 Oregon ballot measure would
have amended the state constitution to prohibit the use of state
facilities to "promote, encourage, or facilitate homosexuality." It
would also have required state. agencies, especially the Depart-
ment of Higher Education and the public schools, to "assist in
setting a standard for Oregon's youth that recognizes homosexu-
ality. . . as abnormal, wrong, unnatural and perverse and that
these behaviors are to be discouraged and avoided."" Both "no
promo homo" policies, as legal theorist Nan Hunter calls them,
were antedated by the (failed) 1978 California Briggs Initiative
under which any school employee could be fired for "advocating,
soliciting, imposing, encouraging or promoting of private or
80. Id. at 25.
81. EDITORS OF THE HARVARD LAw REvIEw, supra note 55, at 122-123;
Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REv.
187, 191 n.15 (1988).
82. Jeffrey Weeks, Pretended Family Relationships, in AGAINST NATURE:
ESSAYs ON HISTORY, SEXUALrTY, AND IDENTITY 134, 137 (1991) (quoting Local
Gov't Act, 1988, ch. 9, Sec. 28 (1) (Eng.)). Weeks also provides a socio-historical
analysis of why the family became a focus of British legal attention.
83. Timothy Egan, Oregon Measure Asks State to Repress Homosexuality, N.Y.
TiMRs, Aug. 16, 1992, at A34.
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public homosexual activity directed at, or likely to come to the
attention of schoolchildren and/or other employees."84
Heterosexual control over standards of child mental health,
over blood, adoptive, and foster parenting, and over the sociali-
zation of children in public institutions facilitates the reproduc-
tion of heterosexual society. It ensures that adult gay men and
lesbians will have little say in what kinds of persons future genera-
tions will be. Even. if it is not possible to make proto-gay children
turn out heterosexual, gay preventative socialization practices
can go some way toward ensuring that the next generation of gay
men and lesbians will accept as reasonable both the requirement
of adopting a pseudonymous heterosexual identity as a condition
of access to the public sphere and their exclusion from any
socially legitimated, "nonpretended" private sphere of marriage,
parenting, and the family. Public commitment to gay prevention
also legitimates the continued punitive expulsion of older gay
and lesbian children from their own families and the termination
of the emotional and material support that families provide for
children.
It is tempting to respond to these various gay preventative
strategies by arguing that pathologizing gender deviance in child-
hood makes little sense in a psychiatric scheme that
depathologizes homosexuality; that in point of fact the children
of gay men and lesbians are just as likely to grow up heterosexual
as are the children of heterosexuals; and that "no promo homo"
policies involve censorship and the legal underwriting of one set
of moral values. Though having a place, such arguments miss
the deeper issue. That deeper issue concerns whether heterosex-
uals as a social group are entitled to claim for themselves exclu-
sive entitlement to determine the character of future
generations.
IV. CONSTRUCTING GAY AND LESBIAN PERSONS AS UNNATURAL
CRIMINALS
The moral prohibition on sodomy, understood as a crime
against nature and sin against God, dates from the Middle Ages
when it was part of a more general prohibition on nonreproduc-
tive sexual acts. 5 The prohibition on sodomy did not presup-
pose a special sort of actor (the homosexual), nor was sexual
84. Cal. Proposition 6, § 3(b)(2) (1978), quoted in Nan D. Hunter,
Identity, Speech, and Equality, 79 VA. L. Rxv. 1695, 1703 (1993). Hunter gives a
detailed account of the full range of no promo homo policies.
85. John Boswell, Categories, Experience and Sexuality, in FoRMs OF DEsiRE,
supra note 5, at 157-158.
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object choice the determinant of who was a sinner.86 The social
construction in the late 1800's of a special sort of sexual actor-
the homosexual-is by now well documented.8 7 With the emer-
gence of the homosexual person as a personality type, sodomy
shifts from being simply a forbidden act, like abortion or adul-
tery, to being one among many indicators of an underlying
psycho-sexual personality structure. Although much has been
made of the conceptual shift from sodomitical act to homosexual
person, less has been made of the resulting normative shift from
locating criminality and immorality in the act itself to locating
them in the person whose essential nature it (supposedly) is to
engage, among other things, in sodomy. The invention of the
homosexual-the pervert, the degenerate, the sexual psycho-
path-opened the doors for the invention of the person for
whom moral depravity and criminality were constitutive of his or
her nature. Criminality and immorality come to reside less in
what one does than who one is. Distinctions between predator
and prey, the corrupt and the corrupted, the (homo)sexual
"addict" and the heterosexual performer of homosexual acts
come to mediate normative judgments about same-sex sexual
conduct.
In Morrison v. State Board of Education,88 judicial discussion of
Morrison's same-sex activity was mediated by assumptions about
who Morrison was. When Marc Morrison's week-long sexual rela-
tionship with a fellow teacher, Fred Schneringer, came to light,
the California State Board of Education charged Morrison with
immoral and unprofessional conduct, and revoked his licenses to
teach secondary school and exceptional children. The court
argued that the Board's interpretation of "immoral conduct" was
overly broad, unconnected to considerations of employees' fit-
ness to teach, and threatened "arbitrarily [to] impair the right of
the individual to live his private life, apart from his job, as he
deems fit."89 Moreover, there was no evidence that Morrison had
sought improper relations with students, had failed to convey to
them correct principles of morality, or that his relationship with
co-workers had been affected by the incident; in short, there was
no evidence of his unfitness to teach.9 ° However, the particular
86. Id. at 159.
87. See, e.g., FoRMs OF DESIaR, supra note 5. Michel Foucault has perhaps
become most well known for articulating the thesis that the homosexual is a
social construction. See 1 MICHAEL FOUCAULT, TE HISTORY OF SEXUALrrY
(1990).
88. 461 P.2d 375 (Cal. 1969)(en banc).
89. Id. at 394.
90. Id. at 392.
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facts that the court chose to highlight in Morrison do not support
this line of reasoning. Instead those facts suggest that Morrison
was not really a homosexual, even if he had engaged in same-sex
sex. The court repeatedly stressed the "limited" nature of Morri-
son's homosexual relationship and observed that Morrison and
Schneringer were suffering severe emotional stress at the time,
that Morrison had suggested women whom Schneringer might
date, that with the exception of the Schneringer incident Morri-
son had not had any "homosexual urges" in a dozen years, and
that there was no evidence of "abnormal activities or desires"
since that incident.9' Here the court seems less interested in
ascertaining whether Morrison's private conduct affected his
public work performance than in ascertaining who Morrison
really is. Is he really a homosexual, that is, a morally suspect kind
of person, whose fitness to teach might reasonably be doubted?
Or is he more innocently just a heterosexual performer of homo-
sexual acts?
The image of gay men and lesbians as morally depraved and
prone to criminal conduct fully flowered in .the McCarthy era's
programs to purge the military and civil service of all "sexual per-
verts." Gay men and lesbians were, by their very nature, a threat
to national security, an inherently subversive element in society,
and "generally unsuitable" for government employment.92 They
were declared to be so by an executive order, which ordered
their dismissal from all branches of government service. 93 Evi-
dence, however thin, of mere homosexual tendencies, even in the
complete absence of evidence of actual sexual activity, was suffi-
cient grounds for dismissal.94 And in 1952, Congress officially
closed the national borders to immigrants with "psychopathic
personalities," i.e., gay men and lesbians.95
This equation, consolidated in the 1950s, of homosexuality
and lesbianism with criminality and immorality produces both an
equation of being gay or lesbian with committing criminal or
immoral acts as well as a concomitant presumption that whatever
it is that heterosexuals are doing (even if that remains unexam-
91. Id. at 377-78.
92. SENATE SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON EXPENDITURES IN
THE EXEC. DEP'TS, EMPLOYMENT OF HOMOSEXUALS AND OTHER SEX PERVERTS IN
GOVERNMENT, S. Doc. No. 241, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1950).
93. 18 Fed. Reg. 2489 (1953).
94. LiLLLN FADERMAN, ODD GiR.S AND TwILIGHT LOVERS: A HISTORY OF
LESBIAN LIFE IN TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA 142-44 (1991).
95. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 212(a), 66
Stat. 163, 182 (1952). For an historical account of the McCarthy era purge of
homosexuals, see BPRUBt, supra note 66.
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ined and unarticulated) must be criminally and morally
innocent.
Judges, employers, university administrations, and others
often infer from the fact that a person is gay or lesbian that they
have engaged in sodomy and thus that they have engaged in
criminal (or criminalizable) activities. In Shahar v. Bowers,96 for
example, the Attorney General of Georgia, Michael Bowers, with-
drew his employment offer when Robin Shahar announced her
marriage to a woman. Bowers equated lesbian marriage with vio-
lation of the anti-sodomy statute that his office was committed to
upholding. Newspaper publishers have refused to publish ads
for gay and lesbian counseling and legal aid on the grounds that
they do not want to be associated with illegal (read: sodomitical)
activity.97 Adoption agencies have refused to permit nonheter-
osexuals to adopt on the grounds that children should not be
placed with parents who violate the law.9" Although almost uni-
formly unsuccessful in court, university administrators, like those
of the University of Missouri, have refused to recognize lesbian
and gay student organizations on the grounds such groups would
increase the incidence of criminal acts of sodomy.99 Attempts to
secure suspect or quasi-suspect class status for gay men and lesbi-
ans, and with it heightened scrutiny tests, have been rejected on
the grounds that sodomy is still criminalized in slightly under
half the states and that laws criminalizing sodomy are not uncon-
stitutional. 1" The equation of being gay or lesbian with commit-
ting sodomy and thus being a criminal also underlies the military
policy of excluding persons simply on the basis of evidence of
their homosexual orientation.101
Equating homosexuality with sodomy ignores the facts that
gay and lesbian sexual practices cover a broad spectrum, sodomy
96. 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 668 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 1992).
97. Mississippi Gay Alliance v. Goudelock, 536 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir.
1976) (en banc).
98. Appeal in Pima City Juvenile Action B-10489, 727 P.2d 830 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1986), cited in EDrroRs OF THE HARVARD LAw REviEw, supra note 55, at 11
n.10.
99. Gay Lib v. University of Mo., 558 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1977).
100. High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d
563, 571 (9th Cir. 1990); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir.
1989); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Padula
v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
101. As Judge Norris caustically observed in Watkins, "The Army equates
homosexuals with sodomists and justifies its regulations as simply reflecting a
rational bias against a class of persons who engage in criminal acts of sodomy.
In essence, the Army argues that homosexuals, like burglars, cannot form a
suspect class because they are criminals." Watkins v. United States Army, 875
F.2d 699, 725 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (Norris, J., concurring).
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being only one possibility; that one may self-identify as gay or
lesbian (just as one may self-identify as heterosexual) without
having sex at all; and that oral and anal sex are hardly unique to
lesbians and gay men. The equation of homosexuality and lesbi-
anism with sodomy, however, makes a peculiar kind of sense if
one begins from the assumption that "homosexuality" and "lesbi-
anism" designate crime-prone personalities. Since what gay men
and lesbians do (sexually or otherwise) is generally not criminal-
ized, the notion of homosexuality-as-criminality can only be
articulated by equating homosexuality with whatever acts happen
to be criminalized.1
0 2
The normative status of the identities "gay" and "lesbian"
thus precedes and infects the normative status of their acts, rather
than as one might suppose, the reverse. What makes same-sex
touching, kissing, hand holding, knee-squeezing, cohabitation,
and marriage wrong is neither so much their same-sexedness nor
their likely eventuation in sodomy. Rather, it is their being done.
by a kind of person, that is, their being homosexual or lesbian acts.
This is perhaps nowhere more clearly evident than in the military
policy itself. Army Regulations exempt from automatic discharge
soldiers who have engaged in same-sex sex but who can prove
that same-sex sexuality was a departure from customary behavior,
is unlikely to recur, and is undesired."°3 As Judge Norris so
nicely summarized Army policy in Watkins v. United States Army,
If a straight soldier and a gay soldier of the same sex
engage in homosexual acts because they are drunk, imma-
ture or curious, the straight soldier may remain in the
Army while the gay soldier is automatically terminated. In
short, the regulations do not penalize soldiers for engaging
in [same-sex] acts; they penalize soldiers who have engaged
in [same-sex] acts only when the Army decides that those
soldiers are actually gay.104
The distinction between an act of same-sex sex (which can
be done by either heterosexuals or nonheterosexuals) and a spe-
cifically homosexual act (which can only be done by homosexuals)
is here out in the open. It is also out in the open in New Hamp-
shire's statute against gay and lesbian adoption, which distin-
102. Homosexuality-as-crime can be- articulated by equating
homosexuality not only with sodomy but with child molestation. Custody,
visitation, adoption, and foster parenting decisions may appeal to this latter
equation.
103. See supra note 37.
104. 875 F.2d 699, 715 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J., concurring) (footnote
omitted). For clarity, I have substituted "same-sex" for "homosexual" in the
original text.
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guishes between "true" homosexuals and those who have
engaged in same-sex sex but can claim a heterosexual identity.1"5
The distinction between same-sex act and distinctively homosex-
ual act operated more covertly in Hardwick. In Justice White's
view, "[t]he issue presented is whether the Federal Constitution
confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sod-
omy."106 This framing of the question not only ignores the
facially neutral character of Georgia's sodomy statute; more
importantly, it ignores the fact that George's statute concerns
acts, not identities. That statute prohibits same-sex sodomy
regardless of whether the doer is homosexual or heterosexual.
Having shifted the focus from acts to identities, Justice White
concludes that homosexuals have no right to engage in sodomy,
leaving open the possibility that heterosexuals do (regardless of the
sex of their partner in sodomy). 0 7
The combined effect of equating homosexuality with crimi-
nality but only statutorily forbidding sodomy is the production a
novel civic status: the citizen-criminal. Almost everything that
gay men and lesbians might consider constitutive of or con-
nected to their being gay or lesbian is legal: nonsodomitical sex
practices, kissing, holding hands, membership in gay organiza-
tions, going to gay bars, holding a marriage ceremony, providing
AIDS and safe sex education, publishing books about being les-
bian or gay, lobbying for AIDS research funding and against anti-
gay initiatives, and so on. Given the legality not just of being gay
(viewed as some inner "tendency") but also of conducting one's
life as a lesbian or gay man, anyone who is gay or lesbian might
naturally conclude that they have the same citizenship status that
any heterosexual has. However, because all things gay or lesbian
are routinely coupled, in legal and lay imaginations, with sodomy
(or child abuse, or solicitation, or some other category of illegal-
ity), nothing one does as a gay man or lesbian is untainted by the
specter of criminality. Everything one does becomes an act of
promoting criminality or immorality. And every gay-positive
statement metamorphoses into an endorsement of crime or
immorality.
Constructed as citizen-criminals, gay men and lesbians
occupy a shadowy territory neither fully outside nor fully inside
civil society. Unlike the criminally insane, whose inability to tell
right from wrong disqualifies them from civic status, gay men
and lesbians formally possess civic status. But unlike heterosex-
105. In re Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d 21, 24 (N.H. 1987).
106. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986) (emphasis added).
107. See Halley, supra note 28, at 1746-47.
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ual citizens, whose relation to crime is presumed to be merely
contingent (they might or might not violate the law), gay men
and lesbians are presumed to be inherently implicated in crimi-
nal activity. Constituted as undesirable citizen-criminals, gay
men and lesbians contribute to production and reproduction
and fulfill their civic duties as "reverse malingerers"-persons
who falsify their status not in order to escape from civic burdens
but in order to accept them. 0 8
This citizen-criminal status gives discriminatory policies
against gay men and lesbians a distinctive flavor. While racial
and gender discrimination are largely predicated on inferiorizing
stereotypes, sexuality discrimination is largely predicated on
criminalizing stereotypes whose ultimate suggestion is not that gay
men and lesbians are incompetent, but that they are untrustworthy
members of civil society. Socially constituted as beings whose
very nature it is to commit crimes against nature, God, and state,
gay men and lesbians, insofar as they publicly claim those identi-
ties, speak under a pall of guilt. Unlike their presumed "inno-
cent" and civic-minded heterosexual counterparts, they cannot
represent themselves as gay men or lesbians without undermin-
ing their standing in the public sphere. That includes their
standing to challenge conventional moral and legal norms.
Heterosexuals have, for example, been extremely successful in
decriminalizing heterosexual "crimes against nature"-use of
birth control, abortion, adultery, heterosexual sodomy. They
have also been reasonably successful in pluralizing acceptable
family arrangements-divorce, single-parenting, egalitarian gen-
der arrangements, separate husband and wife domiciles. As pre-
sumed trustworthy members of civil society, heterosexuals have
the standing to claim that they simply have different moral opin-
ions about the permissibility of "alternative" sexual and familial
practices and to request that law and social practices recognize
differences of opinion. As presumed untrustworthy members,
lesbians' and gay men's expression of different, disagreeing
moral opinions is continuously vulnerable to being reconstituted
as promotion of immorality, if not also criminality. So, for
instance, Michael Bowers reconstituted Robin Shahar's disagree-
ing moral opinion about what makes a relationship a marriage as
a promotion of illegal sodomy.
108. "Reverse malingerer" was the military's inventive label during World
War II for gay men and lesbians who presented themselves as heterosexuals in
order to do military service. See BtRUBt, supra note 66, at 20. The military may
discharge servicemen not only for being homosexual but also for "fraudulent
enlistment" if they did not originally declare their homosexuality.
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CONCLUSION
Sexuality injustice is not best understood as a matter of con-
fining persons who are gay or lesbian to subordinate, dis-
advantaging, exploitable places within sexuality-structured public
and private hierarchies. Thus, specific measures such as
extending privacy rights and anti-discrimination protection to
gay men and lesbians should not be seen as primarily aimed at
remedying systematic inequities in their material condition and
access to opportunities.
Instead, sexuality injustice is better understood as a matter
of displacing gay and lesbian identities to the "outside" of civil
society, and thus denying a place for gay and lesbian identities
within both public and private spheres. First, gay and lesbian
identities are displaced from workplaces, streets, the military,
markets, schools, and other public spaces by requiring gay men
and lesbians to adopt pseudonymous heterosexual identities as a
condition of access to those public spaces. Displacing gay and
lesbian identities from the public sphere in this way amounts to
reserving the public sphere for heterosexuals only. Second, gay
and lesbian identitiesI are displaced from our social future
through legal, educational, psychiatric, and familial practices
that are aimed at insuring the heterosexuality of future genera-
tions. The institutionalization of gay preventative and heterosex-
ual productive measures amounts to reserving for heterosexuals
only exclusive entitlement to determine the character of future
generations. Finally, the displacement of gay and lesbian identi-
ties from civil society is legitimized by equating those identities
with criminality, immorality, and untrustworthiness as a citizen.
Defined as citizen-criminals, gay men and lesbians are denied
equal standing to participate in legal, social, and moral debates,
including, most importantly, debates over the place of gay and
lesbian identity in the public and private spheres.
